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Both the United States and the European Union have
experimented with environmental risk disclosure systems that
attempt to communicate to the public the environmental hazards
posed by the activities of corporations. The United States,
through the regulations promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC"), mandates that companies disclose
limited environmental information.' The European Union
encourages companies to voluntarily disclose more comprehensive
environmental information.2
Although both systems disclose corporate environmental
information to the public, the question remains as to which
system is more effective in doing so. In attempting to answer this
question, commentators have analyzed these two systems from
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many different perspectives. These approaches, however, largely
ignore the premise that the fundamental purpose of any environ-
mental disclosure system is to achieve a nation's public policy
goals through the communication of environmental risk to the
public. 4 The effectiveness of environmental disclosure therefore
depends primarily on the ability to communicate information
efficiently, in a way that the public can understand and act upon,
allowing the attainment of these policy goals.5 This Comment
examines the effectiveness of the environmental disclosure systems
of both the United States and the European Union by addressing
this issue of communication efficiency. In doing so, this Com-
ment uses the "risk communication" methodology, which empiri-
callyanalyzes the effectiveness of risk disclosure systems by
methodically assessing how efficiently these systems communicate
information to the public.
6
Using this approach, this Comment determines that the
environmental disclosure system of the European Union better
' See generally Eric W. Orts, Reflexive Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L.
REV. 1227 (1995) (discussing environmental disclosure from a "reflexive law"
viewpoint); Perry E. Wallace, Disclosure of Environmental Liabilities Under the
Securities Laws: The Potential of Securities-Market-Based Incentives for Pollution
Control, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1093 (1993) (analyzing environmental
disclosure from a market-based efficiency perspective); Robert 1. Lewis, Note,
-Shh! Maybe in My Backyard!" An Equity and Efficiency-Based Critique of SEC
Environmental Disclosure Rules and Extraterritorial Environmental Matters, 78
MINN. L. REv. 1045 (1994) (exploring the extraterritorial implications of
environmental disclosure)
4 See infra Section 4.2.
5 See infra Section 4.3.
6 This is not, however, the first use of the "risk communication"
methodology in this manner. For an excellent risk communication analysis of
the environmental disclosure systems of both the United States and the
European Union prior to the dramatic revisions of the European system in
1993, see generally Michael S. Baram, Corporate Risk Management and Risk
Communication in the European Community and the United States, 2 HARv. J.L.
& TECH. 85 (1989). For examples of the use of the "risk communication"
approach in analyzing other environmental problems, see also F. Reed Johnson
et A., Informed Choice or Regulated Risk? Lessons from a Study in Radon Risk
Communication, in READINGS IN RISK 247 (heodore S. Glickman & Michael
Gough eds., 1990) (measuring the success of the EPA's radon risk reduction
p rogram by assessing how it communicated risk to the public); Peter M.
Sandman, Getting to Maybe: Some Communications Aspects of Siting Hazardous
Waste Facilities, in READINGS IN RISK 233 (Theodore S. Glickman & Michael
Gough eds., 1990) (inferring that community acceptance of hazardous waste




communicates environmental risk to the public, and argues that
the environmental disclosure system used by the United States, as
articulated by the regulations of the SEC, can become more
effective by adopting some of the fundamental risk communica-
tion principles exhibited by the European Union's environmental
disclosure system. Section 2 begins with an examination of the
environmental disclosure system of the United States. Next,
Section 3 contrasts this system with the environmental disclosure
system of the European Union. Section 4 subsequently explains
the analytical framework of the risk communication methodology
used to evaluate these two systems. Finally, Section 5 analyzes the
two systems, concludes that the European system is superior from
a risk communication perspective, and identifies the best way to
use the lessons learned from the European system to improve the
U.S. system. Section 5 also concludes that, in making these
modifications, incremental change is preferable. To use a familiar
analogy, faced with a slowly crumbling dike (the environmental
risk communication system of the United States) holding back a
sea of environmental problems, the logical short term solution for
the United States is not to rebuild the dike. Rather, the United
States should use its proverbial finger to seal the conceptual cracks
in that dike.7
2. THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK DISGLOSURE SYSTEM OF THE
UNITED STATES
2.1. Historical Overview
The United States was the first nation to develop an environ-
mental disclosure system. In the wake of the Great Depression,
Congress enacted securities legislation to impose a general,
affirmative disclosure obligation to all issuers of publicly-traded
securities.8 This legislation's basic purpose was to ensure that
1 "The Hero of Haarlem," also known as the tale of the little Dutch boy,
tells of a resourceful youngster who saves his village from flooding. Upon
discovering a leak in the dike holding back the sea, he plugs the cracked wall
with his finger and saves the community. See MARY MAPES DODGE, HANS
BRINKER, OR THE SILVER SKATES 129 (1946).
s See generally Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. SS 77a-77bbbb (1994)(requi-
ring initial disclosure related to the registration, issue, and sale of securities);
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. S 78a-7811 (1994)(requiring
continued periodic disclosure for issuers whose securities are publicly traded).
In the language of this legislation and related regulations, the terms "issuer,"
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issuers of securities would disclose important information,
allowing investors to make informed business and investment deci-
sions." Congress accordingly granted the SEC the power to
establish rules and regulations requiring the disclosure of informa-
tion "necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors."'0  Over the years, the courts have
concluded that issuing corporations need only disclose "material"
information, defined as information that would assume "actual
significance in the deliberations of a reasonable shareholder."1
Throughout the 1970s, the SEC struggled with the question of
whether this legislation should govern the reporting of environ-
mental information as well. The SEC eventually concluded that
the term "material" must necessarily include the disclosure of
applicable environmental information, in addition to more tradi-
tional financial data. 2 The first step in this evolutionary process
resulted from the broad Congressional mandate expressed in the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"). In
short, Congress wanted
[t]o declare a national policy which will encourage produc-
tive and enjoyable harmony between man and his environ-
ment; to promote efforts which will prevent or eliminate
damage to the environment and biosphere and stimulate
the health and welfare of man; [and] to enrich the under-
standing of the ecological systems and natural resources
important to the Nation....
"registrant," and "reporting company," although not interchangeable, often
refer to the same type of entity: a company required to disclose information to
the public. See id. This Comment refers to a reporting entity by the term used
by t]ae case, regulation, or statute being discussed.
I See 15 U.S.C. S 78b (1994).
10 15 U.S.C. § 77g(a) (1994).
" TSC Indus., Inc. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976). In
explaining this standard, the Supreme Court rejected a lower standard that
"includ[ed] 'all facts which a reasonable shareholder might consider important'"
in making investment decisions. Id. at 445.
12 See Risa Vetri Ferman, Note, Environmental Disclosures and SEC
Reporting Requirements, 17 DEL. J. CORP. L. 483, 485-500 (1992).
13 42 U.S.C. % 43214370d (1994).




Consequently, NEPA profoundly influenced all federal
administrative agencies. Perhaps most significantly, NEPA
affected the operations of all federal agencies. Indeed, Congress
directed all government agencies, to the fullest extent possible, to
interpret and administer the laws of the United States in accor-
dance with the policies set forth in NEPA.5  Furthermore, in
carrying out this mission, Congress encouraged cooperation
among agencies to "use all practicable means, consistent with
other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources."16
In addition to its impact on operations, NEPA affected the
rulemaking function of administrative agencies as well. Most
significantly, the Act provided that "[a]ll agencies of the Federal
Government shall review their present statutory authority,
administrative regulations, and current policies and procedures for
the purpose of determining whether there are any deficiencies or
inconsistencies therein which prohibit full compliance with the
purposes and provisions of [NEPA]."1
Though it took almost four years, the SEC eventually
complied with this mandate. In 1973, the SEC released its first
guidelines regarding environmental disclosure.8 In most ways,
these guidelines were identical to the existing standards for other
corporate disclosure, in that they required registrants to disclose
all "material" effects of compliance with environmental laws. 9
These guidelines were more stringent than existing standards for
non-environmental disclosures, however, in that they obliged
registrants to disclose any "material legal proceedings 'known to
be contemplated by governmental authorities'" which arose under
existing environmental laws.20
Despite the relatively strict nature of these standards, several
public interest groups were nevertheless dissatisfied, eventually
15 See id. S 4332.
11 id. S 4331(b).
17 Id. S 4333.
" Disclosure with Respect to Compliance with Environmental Require-
ments, Securities Act Release No. 5386, Exchange Act Release No. 10116, [1973
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,342, at 83,029 (Apr. 20, 1973).
19 See id.
20 See id. at 83,030.
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bringing suit (the "NRDC litigation") to compel the SEC to
modify these environmental disclosure rules. 21  Generally, these
groups sought to establish a precedent requiring that every
registrant disclose all of the effects of its activities on the environ-
ment.2  The asserted legal basis for this claim was that the
"materiality" standard should logically require disclosure above
and beyond the financial information historically provided,
because "'it is difficult and perhaps impossible for investors to
make either socially responsible or financially sound investment
decisions' in the absence of extensive corporate environmental
information. 23 The D.C. District Court agreed, holding that
[t]here are many so-called "ethical investors" in this
country who want to invest their assets in firms which are
concerned about and acting on environmental problems of
the nation. This attitude may be based purely upon a
concern for the environment; but it may also proceed from
the recognition that awareness of and sensitivity to
environmental problems is the mark of intelligent manage-
ment. Whatever their motive, this Court is not prepared
to say that they are not rational investors and that the
information they seek is not material information within
the meaning of the securities laws.24
Ultimately, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed this decision, holding that NEPA's
requirements were "'essentially procedural'" and therefore did not
21 See National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689
(D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, 606 F.2d 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
See id. at 694. Specifically, these groups called for detailed reports which
would include three types of information. First, they wanted the reports to
describe the nature and effect of any pollution caused by the registrant.
Second, these groups wanted the reports to outline the feasibility of, and any
plans for, correcting pollution caused by the registrant. Third, they wanted the
reports to identify any changes in the registrant's products, projects, production
methods, policies, investments, and advertising made to advance environmental
values. See id.
Id. (citations omitted).




require the achievement of specific substantive goals.2, As long
as the SEC followed a rulemaking procedure that considered
environmental concerns, as contemplated by NEPA, then the
court would find that the agency had complied with the Act.26
Despite the outcome of the NRDC litigation, the SEC did
toughen its environmental disclosure requirements somewhat
during the next few years. In 1979, the Commission issued the
U.S. Steel Release, 27 which made three significant changes to the
existing environmental disclosure standards.2 Most importantly,
this release required that every registrant disclose estimates of
anticipated environmental compliance costs if such costs had been
calculated and were expected to be materially greater than current
costs.29 Also, this release obligated registrants to disclose any
environmental proceeding to which the government was a party,
even if the proceeding was initiated by the registrant."s Finally,
this release stipulated that any registrant could make voluntary
disclosures of environmental information, as long as the informa-
tion provided was accurate and did not neglect any pertinent facts,
the omission of which might be misleading.31
2.2. Current Disclosure Requirements
In the early 1980s, the SEC further refined existing environ-
mental disclosure requirements for registrants, honing the
applicable regulations into their current form. In 1982, the SEC
promulgated Regulation S-K as part of a comprehensive disclosure
32system. Generally, there are three provisions of this regulation
that are applicable to environmental disclosure.
The first of these provisions is Item 101, which principally
requires a general description of a registrant's business activities.33
' National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 606 F.2d 1031, 1044
(D.C. Cir. 1979).
26 See id. at 1045.
2 Environmental Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 33-6130, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-16,224, 44 Fed. Reg. 56,924 (1979) (commonly referred to
as the "U.S. Steel Release").
21 See Ferman, supra note 12, at 496-97.
29 See Environmental Disclosure, supra note 27, at 56,925.
30 See id. at 56,926.
31 See id.
32 17 C.F.R. SS 229.10-229.915 (1996).
33 See id. S 229.101.
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Within this general description, however, registrants must disclose
specifically whether environmental compliance will materially
affect the "capital expenditures, earnings and competitive position
of the registrant and its subsidiaries."3 4 Furthermore, Item 101
incorporates the U.S. Steel Release by requiring that. "[tihe
registrant shall disclose any material estimated capital expenditures
for environmental control facilities for the remainder of its
current fiscal year and its succeeding fiscal year and for such
further periods as the registrant may deem material]."35
Second, Item 103 requires the disclosure of all material
environmental legal proceedings, including both litigation and
administrative action. It mandates that the registrant "[d]escribe
briefly any material pending legal proceedings, other than
ordinary routine litigation incidental to the business, to which the
registrant or any of its subsidiaries is a party or of which any of
their property is the subject."36 Item 103 also incorporates the
U.S. Steel Release, in that it requires registrants to "[i]nclude
similar information as to any such proceedings known to be
contemplated by governmental authorities."
37
Third, Item 303,38 which includes the management's discus-
sion and analysis of financial conditions and the results of
operations ("MD&A"), is generally interpreted to require
environmental disclosure. In general, the purpose of Item 303 is
"to give investors an opportunity to look at the registrant through
the eyes of management by providing a historical and prospective
analysis of the registrant's financial condition and results of opera-
tions, with particular emphasis on the registrant's prospects for
the future."39  Although Item 303 does not explicitly address
environmental liabilities and obligations, its provisions are thought
to require disclosure of relevant forward-looking environmental
information.4° The disclosure required by Item 303, however,
34 Id. § 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
35 Id.
36 Id. 5 229.103 (emphasis added).
37 Id.
38 Id. § 229.303.
' Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 33-6835, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-26831,54 Fed. Reg. 22,427,22,436 (1989)[hereinafter Manageme-
nt's Discussion].




can be differentiated from that mandated by Item 101 because
Item 303 requires a discussion of current "trends, events, and
uncertainties that are reasonably expected to have material effects"
in the future, as distinguished from events that would have a
present material effect.4'
3. THE ENVIRONMENTAL RISK DISCLOSURE SYSTEM OF THE
EUROPEAN UNION
3.1. Comparative Overview
It is perhaps an understatement to note that the environmental
risk disclosure system of the European Union is quite different
from its counterpart in the United States. Basically, there are
three superficial elements which serve to differentiate European
Eco-Management Scheme ("EMAS") from its counterpart in the
United States.42 The most important of these differences is that
EMAS is voluntary in nature. 43 This distinction, however, faces
extinction. Current regulations require the European Commission
to review the progress of the EMAS not more than five years after
its adoption "in the light of the experience gained during its
operation" and to propose to the Council of the European Union
"appropriate amendments, particularly concerning the scope of the
scheme."44 This could very well mean mandatory application to
all European companies in the future.4
The second superficial difference is that EMAS only applies to
companies that engage in industrial activities.46 In looking at
these regulations, it is unclear why the European Council would
choose to limit the application of EMAS to industrial business-
es.47 One likely reason, however, is that the Council felt that
the EMAS should initially concentrate on industrial firms because
"environmental management systems and environmental auditing
[was] already practiced" by such companies.48  Regardless of the
" Management's Discussion, supra note 39, at 22,429.
42 See Orts, supra note 3, at 1290.
' See Council Regulation 1836/93, art. 1(1), 1993 Oj. (L 168) 1, 2.
44 Id. art. 20, at 7.
45 See Orts, supra note 3, at 1293-94.
46 See Council Regulation 1836/93, art. 1(1), 1993 Oj. (L 168) 1, 2.
47 See Orts, supra note 3, at 1295.
48 Council Regulation 1836/93, pmbl., 1993 OJ. (L 168) 1, 2.
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reasoning behind the Council's decision, however, member states
still have the option of applying the EMAS to "sectors outside
industry" on an "experimental basis."49
The third superficial characteristic which differentiates EMAS
is its focus on individual industrial sites.5" EMAS rather loosely
defines a site as "all land on which the industrial activities under
the control of the company at a given location are carried out."
5 '
Therefore, in making disclosure to the public, a company
participating in EMAS may selectively choose among sites where
it wishes to participate.5 2
3.2. Comparative Disclosure Requirements
In addition to these superficial differences, the most substan-
tive factor, at least for the purposes of this discussion, that distin-
guishes the system of the European Union from that of the
United States is the role of disclosure in achieving public poli-
cy.53 Although the sole purpose of the disclosure system of the
United States is to provide adequate investment information to
the public,5 4 the disclosure of information in accordance with the
EMAS is part of a process designed to improve the way a
company handles environmental matters. 5
Having decided to participate in the EMAS, a company must
begin this process by conducting a thorough environmental
49 Id. art. 14, at 6.
50 See id. art. 3, at 3.
51 Id. art. 2(k), at 3.
52 The participating company may choose to only participate with one site,
in which case it woukpdisclose to the public "This site has an environmental
management system and its environmental performance is reported on to the
public in accordance with the Community eco-management and audit scheme."
Id. annex IV, at 17. Should it choose to participate at multiple sites, the
company would disclose "The following sites rhere we carry out our industrial
activities have an environmental management system and their performance is
reported on to the public in accordance with the Community eco-management
and audit scheme.. . ." Id. Or, should the company involve all of its industrial
sites, it would report "All sites in the Community where we carry out our
industrial activities have an environmental management system and their
environmental performance is reported on to the public in accordance with the
Community eco-management and audit scheme." Id.
51 See Orts, supra note 3, at 1290.
14 See supra Section 2.1.




review.5 6 The environmental review is "an initial comprehensive
analysis of the environmental issues, impact and performance" of
each site." In addition to being the basis for all subsequent
environmental practices, this review initiates three different levels
of corporate environmental planning. First, the company must
develop an organizational statement of "environmental policy,"
which articulates the company's "overall aims and principles of
action with respect to the environment." 8 This policy must
include a statement which promises compliance with all relevant
regulatory requirements regarding the environment. 9 Further,
the objective of this policy must be "the reasonable continuous
improvement of environmental performance, with a view to
reducing environmental impacts to a level not exceeding those
corresponding to economically viable application of best available
technology."60 Second, the company must initiate an "environ-
mental programme" for each individual site enrolled in EMAS.
61
The environmental program is perhaps best described as the
company's strategic plan for coordinating the environmental
activities of an individual site with its organizational environmen-
tal policy, and as such incorporates the overall practices, proce-
dures, and processes for the site.62  Finally, the company must
create an "environmental management system" for each site.63
The environmental management system is perhaps best described
as the company's tactical plan for implementing its environmental
policy at a given site, and, as such, must describe the specific
activities the company intends to undertake so as to ensure greater
protection of the environment. 64
Having performed the initial review and the related organiza-
tional planning, the participating company must then internally
audit each site every three years.65 Audits must examine both
56 See id. art. 3(b), at 3.
See id. art. 2(b), at 2.
s Id. art. 2(a), at 2.
51 See id. art. 3(a), at 3.
60 Id.
61 Id. art. 3(c), at 3.
62 See Id. art. 2(c), at 2.
63 Id. art. 3(c), at 3.
6 See id. art. 2(e), at 2.
6' See id. annex II.H, at 13.
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the environmental program and the environmental management
system at each site.6 In doing so, they must address several
mandatory issues. 7 The regulation allows audits performed
either by "auditors belonging to the company or external persons
or organizations acting on its behalf."" Auditing individuals,
however, must have both training in the art of auditing and
understanding of the scientific subject matter audited, including
"knowledge and experience on the relevant environmental
management, technical, environmental and regulatory issues." 69
The company must also undergo external audits conducted by
an independent, outside "accredited environmental verifier."' °
Essentially, the purpose of this redundant exercise is to enforce a
uniform Eurpoean auditing standard, in order to verify the
efficacy of each partipating company's internal audits in comply-
ing with all elements of the EMAS regulation.71  In performing
these duties, verifiers are sworn to strict confidentiality, and "shall
not divulge, without authorization from the company manage-
ment, any information or data obtained in the course of their
auditing or verification activities."72 To ensure proper adherence
to these duties and responsibilities, each European Union member
state has the responsibility for "establish[ing] a system for the
accreditation of independent environmental verifiers and for the
supervision of their activities."73
Having completed these rather rigorous internal and external
reviews, each participating company takes the final step of
reporting the results of this process to the public. To insure
proper reporting, the EMAS requires the preparation and
66 See id. art. 2(f), at 2-3.
67 See id. annex I.C, at 10. These issues include environmental impact
assessment, energy use, raw material conservation, waste reduction, recyc in
noise pollution reduction, evaluation of production process efficiency, product
planning and design efficiency, environmental performance of suppliers,
accident prevention, education of employees, and external information policies.
Id.
68 Id. art. 4(1), at 4.
69 Id. annex H.C, at 12.
70 Id. art. 4(4) at 4.
71 See id. annex ll.B, at 15.
72 Id. art. 4(7), at 4.




dissemination of standardized "environmental statements." 4 In
general, these statements may summarize the findings and
conclusions of audits in a way that is "designed for the public and
written in a concise, comprehensible form."75 These statements,
however, must adhere to a fairly rigid format which includes
rather extensive data on emissions, waste generation, and resource
consumption; a description of the environmental policy, manage-
ment system, and programs; the date for the submission of the
next environmental statement; the name of the environmental
verifier; and all other "environmental issues of relevance."7 6
4. THE RISK COMMUNICATION APPROACH TO ANALYZING
COMMUNICATIVE EFFICIENCY
Although it is clear the United States and the European Union
communicate environmental information to the public in a
different manner, it is not clear which system has the greater
potential to achieve the policy goals that drive environmental
disclosure. In order to analyze this question, it is appropriate to
use the "risk communication" approach. Risk communication is
the field of behavioral science which attempts to understand how
efficiently information about risk is communicated to the
public.' In using this approach, it is instructive to examine why
governments would choose to communicate information about
corporate environmental performance, how such disclosure might
work to achieve policy goals, and what factors might prevent
environmental disclosure from meeting expectations.
4.1. Why Do Governments Require Risk Communication?
While there are many potential reasons why those in positions
of authority might wish to communicate risk, commentators have
generally focused on four basic reasons why public officials
attempt to communicate risk to the public.78
First, many legal systems see the disclosure of risk as a moral
74 Id. art. 5, at 4.
71 Id. art. 5(2), at 4.
76 Id. art. 5(3), at 4.
' See Alonzo Plough & Sheldon Krimsky, The Emergence of Risk
Communication Studies: Social and Political Context, in READINGS IN RISK 223,
226 (Theodore S. Glickman & Michael Gough eds., 3d prtg. 1993).
78 See Baram, supra note 6, at 97-100.
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obligation. 9 From this perspective, it would be negligent for
entities engaged in hazardous activities not to undertake reason-
able measures to prevent harm to others.8" At the very least, this
approach requires those who engage in hazardous activities to
identify the hazards related to their activities and to warn those
individuals placed at risk by these hazards."'
Second, most democracies view risk communication as a
political necessity, 2 because the democratic system is facilitated
by informed citizens freely exercising their franchise.83 In the
words of Thomas Jefferson, "I know no safe depository of the
ultimate powers of the society but the people themselves; and if
we think them not enlightened enough to exercise their control
with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to take it from
them, but to inform their discretion. "84
Third, risk communication is seen by professional risk
managers as a method by which public apprehension over the
uncertain impacts of technology may be eased. 5 For example,
many risk managers feel that excessive media coverage exerts a
powerful influence over public opinion, causing the average
person to over-react to the environmental and health threats posed
79 See id. at 98.
0 For example, since the late nineteenth century, employers who place
inexperienced employees in dangerous work situations have been required to
give adequate instruction so that these individuals fully appreciate the threat
posed to their safety and can take adequate measures to avoid bodily harm. See,
e.g., Ingerman v. Moore, 27 P. 306, 307 (Cal. 1891) (stating the general principle
that an employer is required to instruct inexperienced employees as to the
dangers posed in the workplace); see also Alton Paving, Bldg. & Fire-Brick Co.
v. Hudson, 52 N.E. 256, 257 (ll1. 1898) (recognizing that an employer has a
duty to warn an inexperienced employee of the dangers related to the operation
of a steam shovel); Texas Mexican Ry. Co. v. Douglas's, 11 S.W. 333, 335 (rex.
1889) (clarifying that an employer has a duty to inform an inexperienced
employee of the dangers related to parking a steam locomotive).
81 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) .OF TORTS 5 301 (1965). Note, however,
that in many circumstances a warning may not be not enough to protect an
actor engaged in hazardous activities from liability. Id.
2 See Baram, supra note 6, at 98.
83 See Harry Otway, Experts, Risk Communication, and Democracy Lecture
at the Annual Meeting of the Society for Risk Analsyis, in 7 RISK ANALYSIS
125, 126 (1987).
14 David L. Bazelon, Risk and Responsibility, 205 SCIENCE 277, 278 (1979).




by technology.16  Whether or not the media deserves this
criticism, there is no question that in light of any perceived public
over-reaction, risk managers see it is as their responsibility to calm
public fears by putting risks in perspective, usually in the form of
trusted expert opinion, and to explain the steps those in authority
are taking to manage risks.8 7
Fourth, and perhaps most important for the purposes of this
discussion, risk communication is thought to be politically
expedient.8 By requiring communication rather than obedience
to command and control regulations, which are far more costly to
monitor for compliance, authorities can shift most of the
responsibility for environmental reform to private entities,
thereby taking action without excessive effort or expense.8 9
4.2. How Does Risk Communication Work?
Of course, risk communication is only politically expedient if
it actually affects corporate environmental behavior. Most
theories regarding how this can occur conclude that disclosed
information will awaken the public from its apathetic slumber to
somehow cause offending companies to reform their errant ways
in a manner acceptable to policymakers. ° But how exactly can
the public cause corporations to change their practices?
At first, government officials theorized that environmental risk
communication would work by informing and mobilizing the
public to take part in collective political action at the local level,
thereby compelling polluters to curtail their most offensive
86 See Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 RISK
ANALYSIS 403, 410 (1986). A good example of this was the fear experienced by
residents of Love Canal, exacerbated by "conflicting and fluctuating reports of
the potential danger of the wastes." See Roger E. Kasperson, Six Propositions
on Public Participation and Their Relevance for Risk Communication, 6 RISK
ANALYSIS 275, 275 (1986).
87 See Ralph L. Keeney & Detlof von Winterfeldt, Imp roving Risk
Communication, 6 RISK ANALYSIS 417, 421 (1986). For example, a scientist
speaking to a community about risks "may be carrying out a ritual that displays
confidence and control. The technical information (the message) is secondary
to the real goal of the communicator: 'Have faith; we are in charge.'" Plough
& Krimsky, supra note 77, at 227.
88 See Baram, supra note 6, at 100.
89 See id.
o See Kasperson, supra note 86, at 279.
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activities.91 Over time, however, commentators have come to
realize that individuals, acting solely in pursuit of financial gain
through the medium of the securities market, accomplish the same
results.92 Assuming that the market for securities is an efficient
one, the price of a corporation's stock should reflect all publicly
available information about that company, both good and bad. 3
It follows, then, that adverse information relating to environmen-
tal liabilities and obligations should have the effect of lowering the
price of securities in an efficient market. If this is true, a
company which is required to publicly disclose environmental
information may have an incentive to resolve its environmental
problems in order to preserve the value of its securities in the
public markets. 4
Further, it is increasingly evident that groups of informed
shareholders, acting collectively in pursuit of financial gain, may
have the most significant impact on the environmental behavior
of corporations." Throughout the 1990s, institutional investors,
such as pension plans and mutual funds, have become increasingly
influential." Further, these entities have shown a willingness to
use this clout.97 Institutional investors can no longer adhere to
9 See Plough & Krimsky, supra note 77, at 227-28.
92 See Wallace, supra note 3, at 1125-27.
9' There are three generally accepted theories of market efficiency.
RiCHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
FINANcE 295-96 (4th ed. 1991). The weak theory of efficiency assumes that the
present price of a stock reflects all historical information of past prices for that
stock. See id. The semi-strong theory of efficiency assumes that present prices
reflect not only past prices, but all other published information regarding that
stock. See id. The strong theory of efficiency assumes that present prices
reflect all information that can be obtained through painstaking financial
analysis of the company that issued the stock, including inside information. See
id. When using the term "market efficiency," this comment adopts the semi-
strong theory, as it has been repeatedly verified with empirical data. See id.
94 See Wallace, supra note 3, at 1126-27.
SCfJoel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach
to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649,
657-61 (1995).
96 In 1992, institutional investors held $2.7 trillion, or 54.2%, of the $4.96
trillion market value of stock outstanding. See Institutions Hold Dominant Stake
in Equities Market, Fed Board Data Show, 25 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 27,
at 943 (uly 9, 1993).
97 According to Peter Drucker, "[t]he largest and fastest growing funds,
those of public employees, are no longer content to be passive investors.




the "Wall Street" rule, which specifies that an investor should sell
a company's stock if he or she doesn't agree with the decisions of
management. 98 Consequently, in the future it may be routine
for institutional investors to engage in so called "social investing"
by seeking out and investing in companies with purportedly high
quality environmental policies and practices or, in the alternative,
by influencing the environmental behavior of the companies in
which they already own stock.99 This would be done not for
ideological reasons, but rather under the assumption that such a
strategy is "economically sound because the 0 benefits of social
investing ... are, in economic analysis, as real as [traditional]
investment benefits."1°°
4.3. Why Does Risk Communication Frequently Fail?
Although it is important to understand how risk communica-
tion works when assessing environmental disclosure systems, it is
Peter F. Drucker, Reckoning with the Pension Fund Revolution, HARV. Bus.
REV., Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 106, 106.
9' See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional
Investoras Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1288 n. 29 (1991). The
implications of the size of institutional trades have a significant influence on the
institutional ability to trade. Between 1962 and 1995, the average size of a trade
increased from 204 to 1489 shares, largely due to the influence of institutional
traders. See N.Y. STOCK EXCH., FACT BOOK 98 (1995). Further, institutions
often hold controlling stock blocks of the companies in which they invest. In
1988, institutions as a whole owned 53% of the stock market value of the top
one hundred American corporations. Some of the most extreme examples of
institutional control are General Motors Corporation (82%), Mobil Corporation
(74,, Citicorp (70%), Amoco (86%), and Eli Lilly & Company (71%). See
Carolyn K. Brancato, The Momentum of the Bi& Investor, DIRECTORS &
BOARDS, Winter 1990, at 38, 39. As a result, it is often impractical for an
institutional investor to dispose of its holdings in a company. Trades engaged
in by these entities are necessarily so large that, even absent other market
activity, the market price of the security traded in is significantly affected.
Thus, the substantial losses that an institutional investor would have to suffer
upon such a sale, as a result of supply and demand-related depression of the
price of the security traded in, creates a disincentive to sell. See Coffee, supra
at 1287-89, Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as Corporate
Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1287-89 (1991).
9 See Wallace, supra note 3, at 113842. Indeed, some institutional investors
have established mutual funds where the primary criteria for stock selection is
concern for the protection of the environment. See, e.g., Socially Responsible
Investing Can Pay, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 2, 1997, at B5.
100 John H. Langbein & Richard A. Posner, Social Investing and the Law of
Trusts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 72, 107 (1980) (discussing the compatibility of an
institutional investor's fiduciary duties with "social" investing.
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even more important to discover why risk communication
frequently fails, in order to avoid common stumbling blocks to
achieving environmental policy goals. Generally, risk communica-
tion fails because of the psychological and physical limitations on
human ability to understand and act on information.1
Arguably, the most important limitation on human perception
is known as the status quo bias. In short, the status quo bias
recognizes that people often cling to currently held beliefs or
practices, even when it is easy or cheap to experiment.
Although the recognition of this phenomenon is certainly not
new,'°3 recent research has empirically proven what philosophers
have suspected for centuries. This research has conclusively
shown that people's beliefs change slowly and are extraordinarily
persistent in the face of contrary evidence. 4 People's intitial
impressions will structure the way they interpret subsequent
evidence. They will accept new evidence as reliable and informa-
tive if it is consistent with their initial beliefs, dismissing contrary
evidence as erroneous or unrepresentative." 5
Another significant limitation exists when people lack strong
prior opinions. In this case, the opposite of the status quo bias
'o' See Slovic, supra note 86, at 404-06.
102 See Colin F. Camerer & Howard Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565, 577
(1989). For example, researchers cited by this article mention a colleague who
ordered the same unch every day for many years. One day, his regular meal
was not available, so he ordered something different. He then proceeded to
order this new lunch every day for many years. Id.
103 In the 16th century, Niccolo Machiavelli observed:
It must be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to plan,
more doubtful of success, nor more dangerous to manage than the
creation of a new system. For the initiator has the enmity of all who
would profit by the preservation of the old institutions and merely
lukewarm defenders in those who would gain by the new ones. The
hesitation of the latter arises in part from the fear of their adversaries,
who have the laws on their side, and in part from the general
skepticism of mankind which does not really believe in an innovation
until experience proves its value.
NiccoLo MACHIAVELLI, THE PRINCE 15 (Thomas G. Bergin ed. & trans.,
Harlan Davidson 1947).





occurs: people's opinions are extremely malleable.' 6 According-
ly, the format in which information is presented is at least as
important as the content. 07 Under these circumstances, research
has shown that people are very sensitive to the way in which
information is disclosed, because naive viewpoints are easily
manipulated by presentation format.' 8 Although there is no
research which suggests an optimal presentation format, related
studies do imply that data which allows people to make compari-
sons can be helpful, if correct comparisons are made. Specifically,
comparisons of unfamiliar information with some sort of standard
is thought to be most helpful. 1°
Yet another important limitation on the human ability to
understand and act on information is the innate desire for
certainty. In general, people tend to disregard information if it is
not certain enough for them to believe.1 For example, it is not
uncommon for individuals to either reduce or amplify risk
information so that it can be disregarded. Either they make the
risk seem so insignificant that it can be safely ignored, or so large
that it clearly should be avoided."' One way to assist people in
accepting and comprehending unclear information is to allow
106 See id.
107 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and
the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453, 457 (1981).
10' See Slovic, supra note 86, at 405. For example, in one study researchers
asked people to imagine they had cancer and only two choices of treatment,
either surgery or radiation. The two therapies were described in detail. Then,
some subjects were presented with the cumulative probabilities of surviving sur-
gery. Other subjects received the same cumulative probablities framed in
terms of dying from surgery, rather than surviving or example, instead of
being told that 68% of those having surgery will have survived after one year,
they were told that 32% will have died). Framing the statistics in terms of
dying from surgery increased the percentage of subjects choosing radiation from
25% to 42%. The effect was as strong in physicians as it was in laypersons. See
Barbara J. McNeil et al., On the Elicitation of Preferences for Alternative
Therapies, 306 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1259, 1261-62 (1982).
109 See Emilie Roth et al., What Do We Know About Making Risk
Comparisons?, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 375, 376 (1990). It is important to note that
while empirical research generally supports this assertion, the use of compari-
sons, in particular comparisons with a standard, has not proven to be as heIpful
as originally theorized. Nevertheless, it is the best answer that current behav-
ioral scientific research can provide. Id. at 381-84.
110 See Paul Slovic et al., Rating the Risks, in READINGS IN RISK supra note
77, at 61, 66.
1 See id.
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them access to professionals who can help clarify this infor-
mation.11 2  It is, however, important for these professionals to
give unambiguous advice, lest they add to the undesirable effects
of uncertainty on the public."3
5. SEALING THE CONCEPTUAL CRACKS IN THE U.S. SYSTEM
5.1. Status Quo Bias: The Necessity for Incremental Change
Before considering any specific changes that may be desirable
for the U.S. environmental risk disclosure system, it is important
to determine the best method for making such changes. Some
commentators have called for radical change in this system.
114
Risk communication theory, however, because of its understand-
ing of the status quo bias, recognizes that dramatic changes rarely
occur. This is because individuals are more comfortable relying
on initial impressions to interpret subsequent information."1
Because most of the interested parties who rely on environmental
disclosure have formed their initial impressions within the familiar
confines of the current system and reasonably expect to continue
receiving future information within the same general format, the
existing environmental regime has always developed, and must
invariably continue to develop, gradually.
11 6
112 See Slovic, supra note 86, at 405.
113 See Slovic et al., supra note 110, at 66. For example, Senator Edmund
Muskie once "called for 'one-armed' scientists who do not respond 'on the one
hand, the evidence is so, but on the other hand . . .' when asked about the
health risks of pollutants." Id.
14 The Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
Carol Browner, asserts:
[T]he successes that are available if we continue the traditional
regulatory path are incremental at best. The current regulatory system
is about oing from A to B to C. The changes we undertake today are
about going from A to Z. I don't believe anyone in this country -
whether an environmentalist or a CEO - believes that incremental
steps will achieve the kind of future we all want.
Orts, supra note 3, at 1229.
115 See supra notes 102-105 and accompanying text.
116 Professor Blomquist refers to this as "the notion of recurring evolution-
ary change" in modern environmental law. See Robert F. Blomquist, "Clean
New World": Toward an Intellectual History of American Environmental Law,
1961-1990, 25 VAL. U.L. REV. 1, 6 (1990). This notion characterizes modern




There is a long list of self-interested parties who exacerbate
this incremental effect because they owe their very existence to
the system they have helped to create.1 17 At the top of this list
are the lawyers and consultants that currently make their living
guiding clients through the difficult maze of environmental
disclosure requirements. By the year 2000, the estimated expendi-
tures made in the United States to comply with environmental
protection programs and to control pollution will be approximate-
ly 2.5% of Gross Domestic Product ("GDP")." As the group
which receives the bulk of these expenditures in the form of
professional fees, environmental professionals certainly have a
large vested interest in the continuation of the current system.
Thus, it is not reasonable to expect this influential group to accept
dramatic changes in a system that they have spent a professional
lifetime learning and to which they owe their livelihood.'19
This can also be said of the legions of government bureaucrats
and politicians who administer the current system. Indeed, any
administrative bureaucracy displays a tendency to perpetuate itself
through the self-seeking behavior of employee-bureaucrats. 20 It
rules, and strategies [that] invariably drift and move when plotted over time"
because of "the indirect effect of political ideologies and interest groups." Id. at
5-6 (describing the theories of William Rodgers and Thomas Schoenbaum).
Historian Samuel P. Hays also sees an incremental approach to environmental
law in the United States. He asserts that "[a]s one reviews the relevant
potential subjects for such an analysis- cost-benefit, comparative risk, relation-
ship between private and public, federal separation of powers, federal-state-local
relationships, the pattern of political forces- it is not difficult to observe that
incrementalism reigns .... " Samuel P. Hayes, The Future of Environmental
Regulation, 15 U. PITT. J. L. & CoM. 549, 549 (1996). Not surprisingly,
securities law is also increasingly seen as being evolutionary in nature.
Professor Joel Seligman concludes that "the world of corporate and securities
law is often a more complicated, more slowly evolving one than the law and
economics theorists would have us believe." Seligman, supra note 95, at 653.
117 See Blomquist, supra note 116, at 5.
118 The consulting firm of McKinsey & Company estimates that between
1972 and 1992, "annual [] environment. protection costs for the United States
tripled as a percentage of [GDP], from 0.88% to 2.39%." Further, the firm
estimates that costs will "increase to 2.47% of GDP, or around $200 billion, by
the year 2000." Noah Walley & Bradley Whitehead, It's Not Easy Being Green,
HARV. Bus. REV., May-Jun. 1994, at 46.
119 See Hays, supra note 116, at 573.
" See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 421, 448-51 (1987). This is because "administrators will attempt to
promote their own interests at the expense of the interests of the public" and
"seek above all to enlarge their own powers. . . ." Id. at 450.
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would be unreasonable to expect that a radical change in the status
quo would be allowed by this powerful group either."'
Oddly enough, even environmentalists have a stake in the
current disclosure system. Some environmental groups have
established a niche in sifting through and interpreting the moun-
tain of information which is disclosed by companies every year,
publishing and selling this information to interested parties."z
Because of the time and effort invested by environmentalists in
understanding the current disclosure system, and because of the
financial support they receive for their efforts, there may be
resistance to change from this group as well.
Thus, in the face of certain resistance to radical change, a risk
communication standpoint necessitates incremental modifications
of the current environmental disclosure system used by the United
States. Indeed, the approach of the little Dutch boy might be the
most workable solution in the present situation. Given a dike of
environmental regulation and risk disclosure that has sprung a few
leaks, it may be best, at least in the short run, merely to seal the
conceptual cracks, rather than to rebuild the entire dike.
5.2. Manipulation of Viewpoints: The Necessity of a Meaningful
Disclosure Format
The problem-solving approach of the little Dutch boy is not
the only useful lesson to learned from the European system.
Incremental change in the U.S. system would be especially
effective for implementing a more standardized disclosure format.
Risk communication theory recognizes that presentation format
is at least as important as the information itself.' Consequent-
ly, a standardized presentation format assists the public in
understanding and acting on any information given, increasing the
probability of successfully accomplishing public policy goals. 4
5.2.1. Uniform Extraterritorial Disclosure
The European system excels at standardization because the
EMAS encourages uniform extraterritorial disclosure. In other
121 See Hays, supra note 116, at 574.
122 See John Holusha, Environmentalists Assess Corporate Pollution Records,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 1991, at D1.
123 See supra notes 106-08 and accompanying text.




words, the EMAS allows the public to ascertain from a company's
environmental disclosure whether it is engaging in environmental-
ly friendly activities outside the company's country of origin.
Because the EMAS is a site-based system, designed to identify
those sites where a company is complying with EMAS standards,
it is easy to assess a company's performance both inside and
outside the borders of its member country of origin."2 This is
simply not the case in the United States under current SEC
environmental disclosure rules. Although Item 303 provides for
uniform extraterritorial treatment of forward-looking information,
Items 101 and 103 are rather inconsistent in terms of requiring
disclosure of relevant extraterritorial compliance costs, risks, and
legal actions. 26
To the credit of the SEC, Item 303 can be interpreted as
requiring the disclosure of forward-looking material compliance
costs and proceedings in any country around the globe, because
the language of this provision makes no distinctions for territorial
application."i As long as a corporate trend, demand, commit-
ment, event or uncertainty involving environmental performance
is likely to come to fruition, the company must report it,
regardless of territorial origin.
121
Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for Item 101. On the
one hand, companies must purportedly meet a higher standard for
125 See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text. The EMAS has, however,
received criticism for allowing participation in the system without compliance
at all sites. Orts, supra note 3, at 1297-98. Furthermore, there is currently no
method of identifying whether a company participating in EMAS is engaged in
environmentally friendly activities in countries outside of the European Union.
See Council Regulation 1836/93, annex IV, 1993 Oj. (L 168) 1, 17. At least
within the European Union, however, it is easy to ascertain whether a
company is engaged in environmentally friendly activities within each of the
member states, making EMAS the first truly international environmental disclo-
sure system. See id.
1' See Lewis, supra note 3, at 1070-71.
127 See 17 C.F.R. S 229.303 (1996).
128 There is a two-part test for determining whether environmental
uncertainty must be disclosed. If management determines that the uncertainty
is not reasonably likely to occur, no disclosure is required. If management
cannot make that determination, it must evaluate the consequences of that
uncertainty. Disclosure is required unless management determines that a
material effect on the registrant's financial condition or results of operations are
not reasonably likely to occur. See Management's Discussion, supra note 39,
at 22,430.
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disclosing extraterritorial environmental risks under Item 101.29
On the other hand, however, Item 101 only requires the disclo-
sure of material compliance costs associated with "[f]ederal, [s]tate
and local provisions." '"° Thus, although one possible interpreta-
tion of Item 101 might require uniform extraterritorial disclosure,
the plain language of its provisions would seem to indicate
otherwise. 31
Likewise, Item 103 does not provide for uniform extraterritori-
al coverage in disclosing pending legal actions against reporting
companies. Currently, companies must disclose material proceed-
ings both domestically and abroad "known to be contemplated by
governmental authorities.1  The company may ignore this
obligation, however, if it deems the action to be "ordinary routine
litigation incidental to the business."3 Some time ago, the SEC
sealed this loophole, at least domestically, by requiring disclosure
of all environmental proceedings "arising under any Federal, State
or local provisions."3 4 There is, however, no similar provision
that closes this loophole for extraterritorial legal matters.
5.2.2. Uniform Disclosure Standards
Another way the United States could improve standardization
would be to provide a more uniform disclosure standard for
reportable information. Again, the European system provides a
good model for this. Currently, the EMAS goes into great detail
not only in describing the procedures that a reporting company
12 Item 101(d)(2) requires the disclosure of "[a]ny risks attendant to the
foreign operations," rather than the normal materiality standard for disclosure.
17 C.F.R. S 229.101(d)(2)(1996).
130 Id. 229.101(c)(1)(xii).
131 According to a no-action letter issued by the SEC in 1973, registrants
must report compliance costs in foreign countries if they have a material impact
on business operations. See Air Products and Chemicals, Inc., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,429, at 83,229 G[une
11, 1973). However, the authority of these instructions is in doubt. Generally,
no-action letters do not give guidance beyond the specific factual situation
addressed, and thus do not carry the weight of SEC rules or regulations. More
importantly, it is very clear that the drafters of Regulation S-K intended to
supersede earlier disclosure regulations and their interpretive releases. See 17
C.F.R. S 229.10(a) (1996).
132 17 C.F.R. S 229.103 (1996).
133 Id.




must follow, but also in articulating precisely the information that
must be reported and the specific format in which it must be
provided to the public. 3
The SEC rules, however, rely on a vague standard to judge the
potential reportability of information. Unfortunately, the
application of this standard is not consistent throughout the SEC
environmental disclosure rules.136 In general, the rules require
that all material information must be disclosed. 137  The test for
reportability applied by Item 303, however, does not follow the
typical "materiality" analysis of Items 101 and 103. Indeed, the
SEC expressly precludes the application of the typical materiality
standard to disclosure concerning the prediction of future actions
and events.138 Under Item 303, this type of future disclosure,
more commonly known as "forward-looking information,"139 is
governed by "its own standard for disclosure- i.e., reasonably
likely to have a material effect. ' 40
5.2.3. Sealing the Conceptual Cracks
Although it might be too dramatic a change to require the
specific disclosure of information in a standardized format as
required by the EMAS, it would be prudent to adopt a few minor
changes designed to make environmental disclosure under the SEC
rules a bit more uniform. Minimally, this should include
modification of Items 101 and 103 to require the disclosure of
extraterritorial environmental information, and the application of
13 See supra Section 3.2.
136 See Lewis, supra note 3, at 1072-73.
137 See supra Section 2.2.
Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and
Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company Disclosures, supra note 39,
at 22,430 n.27.
19 Id. at 22,428. There are two types of forward-looking disclosure.
"Required" disclosure, which must be reported in accordance with Item 303 and
to which a materiality standard, modified or otherwise, would attach, concerns
"currently known trends, events, and uncertainties that are reasonably expected
to have material effects." Id. at 22,429. "Optional" disclosure, which may be
reported in accordance with Item 303, involves "anticipating a future trend or
event or anticipating a less predictable impact of a nown event, trend or
uncertainty." Id.
140 Id. at 22,430 n.27.
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a common materiality standard to Items 101, 103, and 303.141
This might be accomplished by rule, regulation, or interpretive
release.
Another way in which greater standardization might be
achieved without imposing too great a burden on the existing
system would be to allow shareholders a greater role in deciding
the environmental disclosure format of companies in which they
own shares. One way to do this would be for the SEC to support
the efforts of shareholders in their attempts to implement binding
resolutions affecting the environmental disclosure policies of
companies in which they own stock.
Historically, shareholders have had the right to submit such
proposals for inclusion in a corporation's proxy solicitation
materials, which are routinely distributed to, and voted on, by all
shareholders. 42 Currently, Rule 14a-8(a) generally requires a
company to include a shareholder's proposal in the company's
proxy statement. 43 There are many exceptions, however, that
141 Given recent Congressional and administrative action, it seems highly
unlikely that the disclosure of forward-looking information will be held to the
same materiality standard as historical information, at least in the near future.
While the standard for disclosure of forward-looking environmental informa-
tion itself has not changed, there have been dramatic changes in the standard
governing the treatment of forward-looking information after it has been
disclosed. For some time now, the SEC has allowed a safe harbor" for
forward-looking information after it has been disclosed. See 17 C.F.R.
5230.175 (1996. This "safe harbor" protects disclosers of forward-looking
information from liability for making fraudulent statements, so long as the
statement was reasonable and disclosed in good faith. Id. 5 230.175(a). As
recently as 1994, however, the SEC queriedwhether "required" forward-looking
information should be held to the same standard as "required" historical
information. See Safe Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act
Release No. 33-7101, Exchange Act Release No. 34-34831, 59 Fed. Reg. 52,723,
52,731 (1994). Surprisingly, the SEC has never answered this question. Safe
Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, 61 Fed. Reg. 24,073 (1996). Never-
theless, Congress apparently resolved the issue in 1996 by granting "safe
harbor" status to all forward-looking information, thereby giving support to the
notion that forward-looking information ought to be leld to a different
standard than historical information. See 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (Supp I. 1995); 15
U.S.C. S 78u-5 (Supp. I 1995). Given these differences in treatment of
information after it is disclosed, it stands to reason that there will continue to
be differences in the standards which govern whether information need be
disclosed in the first place.
142 See Amalgamated Clothing & Textile Workers Union v. Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc., 821 F. Supp. 877, 881-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (describing the history
of the origin of this right).




allow the company to omit such proposals from its proxy state-
ment.
144
Recently, many shareholders have attempted to submit
proposals which, with the consent of a majority of the corporatio-
n's shareholders, would require the corporation to disclose
environmental data in a standardized format. For example,
shareholders have attempted to require corporations in which they
own stock to adopt the controversial Coalition for Environmen-
tally Responsible Economies' ("CERES") principles, which require
the release of extensive environmental information in a rigid
disclosure format.1 45 The SEC has hindered these attempts to
standardize corporate environmental disclosure by allowing
companies to omit such proposals, assuming them to be
"moot."146 As a result, shareholders have little, if any, ability to
'" A company that wishes to omit a proposal from its proxy material must
file the following with the SEC: (1) a copy of the proposal, (2) any statement
in support of the proposal submitted by the shareholder, and (3) a statement
explaining why the proposal may be excluded. See id. at S 240.14a-8(d).
Grounds for exclusion include mootness, relatedness to ordinary business
operations, and duplication of previous proposals. See id. at S 240.14a-8(c).
145 See, e.g., The Proctor & Gamble Company, SEC No-Action Letter, 1994
SEC No-Act. LEXIS 609, at *6 (Jul. 15, 1994). This proposal notes that the
theory behind the CERES Principles is that public accountability is necessary'
in the public arena, and that such accountability can be best achieved only if
"(1) there is public reporting of basic, standardized data pertaining to uniform
substantive principles; and (2) such data is presented in a format wich permits
comparison among companies." Id.
146 This was not always the case. Long before the CERES principles were
even developed, the SEC would generally not allow companies to omit proxy
proposals which advocated the development or disclosure of environmental
information in a particular format. See, e.g., General Elec. Co., SEC No-Action
Letter, [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,720, at 83,931
(Feb. 6, 1974)(requiring inclusion of a proposal to develop an energy impact
statement); cf General Motors Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 79,753, at 84,030 (Mar. 22,
1974)(requiring inclusion of a proposal to require the board of directors to
obtain an environmental impact statement before establishing or discontinuing
a facility).
Apparently, the SEC has subsequently reversed this position, determining
that proxy proposals requesting information in a specific format may be
duplicative of previous requests for similar information already provided by a
company in a different format, thereby making the proxy proposal "moot."
In general, any "moot" proposal may be omitted in accordance with SEC
regulations. See 17 C.F.R. S 240.14a-8(c)(10)(1996). In numerous no-action
letters, the SEC has taken the position that a proposal may be considered moot,
and thus omitted, when the registrant has "substantially" implemented the
action requested by the proxy. See, e.g., Amoco Corp., SEC No-Action Letter,
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influence the way in which they receive corporate environmental
information. It would help if the SEC would recognize that the
format in which information is received is at least as important to
these shareholders as the information itself. An important starting
point would be to require companies to include standardization
proposals in their proxy solicitations. An easy way to do this
would be to eliminate the exemptions that allow the omission of
such proposals.
5.3. Desire for Certainty. The Necessity of Professional Guidance
Another area in which the United States might benefit from
careful study of the European system is in providing greater access
to environmental professionals. Risk communication studies
indicate that the public may disregard information entirely if it is
ambiguous, reducing the probability of achieving public policy
goals.' 4 One way to reduce this uncertainty is to provide access
to professionals whose opinions and guidance can help the public
to understand and act on the environmental information disclosed
by companies.4
5.3.1. Public Access to Environmental Professionals
Again, this is an area in which the European system performs
1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 124, at *1 (Jan. 31, 1994) (allowing exclusion of
proposal to disclose information in accordance with the CERES principles
when another environmental disclosure mechanism exists); Allied Signal, Inc.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1994 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 129, at *1 GJan. 31,
1994) (allowing exclusion of proposal to disclose information in accordance with
the CERES principles when information is routinely disclosed to customers);
E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., SEC No-Action Letter, 1995 SEC No-Act.
LEXIS 245, at *1 (Feb. 14, 1995)(allowing exclusion of proposal to disclose
environmental information in the company's annual report when similar
information is disclosed in accordance with Item 303). Further, it appears as
if any actions taken by a company to disclose environmental information to the
public will be deemed "substantial" implementation of a request to follow the
CERES principles, whether or not information is actually disclosed in a format
which resembles the CERES format. See id. at *1-*9. However, the
pendulum may once again be swinging the other way. See, e.g., Amoco Corp.,
SEC No-Action Letter, 1996 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 146, at *1 (Feb. 1,
1996)(requiring inclusion of proposal to report on the specific impacts of oil
and gas exploration on a particular geographic region, even though another
environmental disclosure mechanism exists .
147 See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.




very well. One of the key requirements of the EMAS is that
qualified environmental professionals must audit and verify all
operations and disclosure documents of participating compa-
nies. 14  This gives credibility to the information provided,
allowing the public to use this information with confidence.
Further, participating companies have no reason to object to this
process, as particularly sensitive information cannot be disclosed
by these professionals without the approval of corporate manage-
ment. 
150
Unfortunately, this is not the case in the United States. The
problem is not that companies cannot audit their operations and
disclose the results to the public under current SEC rules. Rather,
they refuse to do so because of the fear that information discov-
ered and disclosed as a result of such audits will be used against
them in civil and criminal actions brought by the EPA. This fear
discourages otherwise responsible reporting companies that wish
to remedy past mistakes from engaging the services of environ-
mental professionals.15' Apparently, this fear is well-founded
because "[t]hrough the course of the environmental compliance
and audit program, admissible, documentary evidence can be
generated. What was designed to be a shield may transform itself
into the government's sword."" 2 Indeed, courts routinely give
government agencies access to what would otherwise be confiden-
tial audit documents. 53
Lending credibility to the notion that incremental change is
the rule rather than the exception when describing change in
14 See supra notes 65-73 and accompanying text.
150 See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
151 A 1992 survey of corporate general counsel found that 37.4% of
companies had never undertaken a formal survey of environmental compliance,
and 16% admitted to having altered environmental auditing procedures owing
to "concern with whether the violations they find could be used against them."
Marianne Lavelle, More Lawyers Expect to Urge Their Clients to Examine
Compliance, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 16, 1992, at S6.
152 Mary Jo Gilsdorf & Joseph M. Manko, The Sword and Shield in
Environmental Criminal Prosecutions... the Dilemma Posed by the Department
of Justice, 205 LEGAL INTELLIGENCER 2790, 2791 (Oct. 24, 1991).
153 See, e.g., United States v. Dexter Corp., 132 F.R.D. 8 (D. Conn. 1990)
(denying self-evaluative" privilege for documents relating alleged Clean Water
Act violations); United States v. Chevron, U.S.A. Inc., No. 88-6681, 1989 WL
121616, at *6 cE.D. Pa. Oct. 16, 1989) (denying attorney-client privilege for
internal environmental audits of Chevron's oil refinery in Philadelphia in the
context of a discovery request relating to air emissions of benzene).
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environmental standards,"5 the EPA's response to the issue of
environmental audit privilege has been characteristically evolution-
ary.'55 Very early on, the EPA strongly rejected any inference
that it should grant an environmental audit privilege.156 As
recently as 1994, the EPA had made no significant changes to this
initial position.
57
In response to criticism of this practice, however, and perhaps
in recognition that many companies were not conducting
environmental audits because of its position, the EPA released a
Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim
Policy Statement in April, 1995.158 This interim policy attempt-
ed to create limited incentives for companies to adopt environ-
mental auditing programs, without granting a blanket audit
privilege. Specifically, the EPA represented that it would not seek
punitive or gravity-based civil penalties with regard to environ-
mental audits if companies met seven conditions.'5 9  These
conditions included voluntary self-policing, voluntary disclosure
of any violations, prompt correction of violations, remediation of
any substantial or imminent endangerment of human health or
the natural environment, remediation of the violation, no lack of
measures which could have prevented the violation, and coopera-
"' See supra Section 5.1.
155 As with other changes in environmental law, this incremental approach
is not unusual. Some commentators have described environmental rulemaking
as a gradual bargaining process, in which the EPA initially takes a strong, some-
times radical, stand on an issue. As time progresses, and interested parties make
their views known, the EPA slowly modifies its position to accomodate
interested parties while still providing protection to the environment. See
Heidi Burgess et al., Negotiation in the Rulemaking Process (The 301(h) Case), in
RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY DISPUTES 222, 251 (Lawrence
Susskind et al. eds., 1983).
"56 In its first statement of policy regarding environmental audits, the
Agency bluntly asserted that it had the "authority to request and receive any
relevant information - including that contained in audit reports -under various
environmental statutes." Environmental Auditing Policy Statement, 51 Fed.
Reg. 25,004, 25,007 (1986) In its general policy statement, the EPA stated that
it would "not promise to forgo inspections, reduce enforcement responses, or
offer other such incentives in exchange for implementation of environmental
auditing or other sound environmental management practices." Id.
157 See Restatement of Policies Related to Environmental Auditing, 59 Fed.
Reg. 38,455, 38,457 (1994).
158 60 Fed. Reg. 16,875 (1995).




tion with the EPA."6 Corporations, however, did not embrace
this policy. 6' This was primarily because the EPA had not
made the policy permanent, and disclaimed any obligation to act
in accordance with its own guidance.
162
In response to continued criticism and skepticism over the
interim policy, the EPA issued its permanent audit policy in
December, 1995.16 On the surface, the permanent policy would
appear to be rather similar to the interim policy, in that the EPA
represents that it will not seek punitive or gravity-based penalties
against companies which meet the seven conditions addressed by
the interim policy, and satisfy an additional eighth condition that
the violation not be repetitive in nature. 164 In many ways,
however, the final policy is superior to the interim policy. Most
notably, the final policy provides much needed clarification on
two key issues. First, the final policy explicitly states that volun-
tary disclosure must be made to the EPA, rather than to state
agencies, in order for the policy to apply.' 65 Second, the final
policy provides a bright line rule to determine when previous
violations would bar a regulated entity from obtaining relief under
the policy.
166
Even so, corporations have not embraced this new and
improved version of EPA's environmental audit policy with any
160 See id.
161 See Paul J. Curran & Gregory J. Wallance, The New EPA "Interim
Policy," Which Is Meant to Encourage Companies to Report Violations, May Have
the Opposite E ect, NAT'L L.J., July 31, 1995, at B4; Gail S. Port, Does EPA
Policy Really Provide Protection?, N.Y.L.J., June 12, 1995, at S1.
162 The Interim Policy stated:
This interim policy is not final agency action, but is intended solely as
guidance. It is not intended, nor can it be relied upon, to create any
rights enforce-able by an party in litigation with the United States.
EPA officials may decide to follow the guidance provided in this
interim policy or to act at variance with the guidance based on analysis
of case-specific facts and circumstances.
Voluntary Environmental Self-Policing and Self-Disclosure Interim Policy
Statement, supra note 158, at 16,879.
163 Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and
Prevention of Violations, 60 Fed. Reg. 66,706 (1995).
164 See id. at 66,708-10.
165 See id. at 66,711.
166 See id. at 66,712.
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more enthusiam than they greeted the interim version.16 Again,
this is because several fundamental shortcomings of the interim
policy were not corrected in promulgating the final policy. Most
importantly, the policy seems to have no binding effect whatsoev-
er.'68 Also, the policy is not valid in judicial proceedings. 6 9
Finally, the policy conflicts with, and arguably negates, the audit
privileges afforded by many states. Thus far, the legislatures of
seventeen states have enacted some form of audit privilege or
immunity law in which information developed from voluntary
environmental audits conducted by companies cannot be used in
enforcement actions."7 The EPA, however, refusing to ac-
knowledge any such audit privilege or immunity, "remains
opposed to state legislation that does not include these basic
protections, and reserves its right to bring independent action
against regulated entities for violations of federal law."171
5.3.3. Sealing the Conceptual Cracks
Although it might be too dramatic a change to mandate the
involvement of environmental professionals in a company's
environmental affairs as does the EMAS, it would certainly seem
prudent to eliminate any obstacles to the voluntary inclusion of
these professionals in the disclosure process. Although EPA
policies generally discourage companies from conducting and
disclosing environmental audits, the SEC might play a key role in
encouraging the EPA to refrain from punishing corporations
which engage in good faith environmental audits. For both the
167 See Laurence S. Kirsch & .. Walter Veirs, Although the EPA Recently
Issued Its Final Policy on the Confidentiality of a Company s Environmental Self-
Audit, Numerous Questions Remain Unanswered, NATL LJ., Mar. 11, 1996, at
B5.
16I Although the EPA does not explicitly disavow an obligation to follow
the final policy, as it does in the interim policy, it still qualifies the applicability
of the final policy by indicating that "[t]he policy is not final agency action,
and is intended as guidance. It does not create any rights, duties, obligations,
or defenses, implied or otherwise, in any third parties." Incentives for Self-
Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and Prevention of Violations, supra
note 163, at 66,712.
169 See id.
"o See Daniel M. Steinway & Steven L. Humphreys, States Assume Greater
Role In Policy Implementation, N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1996, at S5.
171 Incentives for Self-Policing: Discovery, Disclosure, Correction and




EPA and the SEC to adopt a binding joint policy that recognizes
the audit privileges and immunities afforded by the states, or
creates federal privileges or immunities, would be a good first step.
An even better solution would be for Congress to decisively pass
legislation that grants federal privilege and immunity for informa-
tion obtained and disclosed as a result of environmental audits,
thereby allowing the public greater access to trustworthy informa-
tion verified by environmental professionals. 72
6. CONCLUSION
The EMAS provides a model for increasing the efficiency of
environmental law in general, and for improving the effectiveness
of environmental disclosure in particular. Perhaps its real value
as a model lies in the specific ideas it provides for improving
environmental disclosure in the United States. Taking a lesson
from another European role model, it is perhaps best for the
United States to adopt an approach similar to the little Dutch
boy's: reforming a viable system rather than replacing it entirely.
Thus, in making environmental disclosure more efficient, it would
be desirable for the SEC to incrementally adopt the most
pertinent provisions of the EMAS by encouraging standardized
disclosure and by providing access to the expertise of environmen-
tal professionals throughout the disclosure process. Although
these reforms are not be the only lessons to learn and apply from
the EMAS experiment, risk communication theory suggests that
they might be the most effective.
172 Such legislation was introduced to Congress in early 1995. See S. 582,
104th Cong. (1995); H.R. 1047, 104th Cong. (1995). No action has been taken
on these bills, however, since their introduction. In large part, this is because
of lack of political support. Primarily, Vice President Al Gore, speaking for
the Clinton Administration, opposes these bills. See Vice President Speaks Out
Against Bills to Grant Privilegefor Environmental Audits, 27 Env't Rep. (BNA)
No. 9, at 502-03 (une 28, 1996). However, even one of the original sponsors
of this legislation, former Senator Mark Hatfield, conceded, "I t ink improve-
ment needs to be made to this bill." Haitfeld Tells Judiciary Panel HisAudit Bill
Needs Some Improvements, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA), May 22, 1996,
available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Drexec File.
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